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Faith-Based Charter Schools: An Idea Whose
Time Is Unlikely to Come1*
Charles J. Russo
University of Dayton, Ohio
Gerald M. Cattaro
Fordham University, New York

S

imply stated, the efforts of their supporters notwithstanding,1 it is
unlikely that faith-based charter schools,2 which are opening as the
number of religiously affiliated nonpublic schools declines,3 can survive judicial scrutiny. Moreover, even if religious charter schools, whether
Catholic,4 Christian,5 Jewish,6 or Muslim,7 can withstand challenges in federal courts,8 it is likely that they would be struck down in state courts due to
significant state constitutional restrictions9 forbidding aid to religious institutions. Further, overlapping statutory limits typically prevent religious entities
from operating charter schools,10 require that they be nonsectarian in nature,11
and/or restrict them to operating in nonsectarian manners.12
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the charter school movement, which began in 1991 in Minnesota,13 has spread to 40 states plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.14 Charter schools, which are public
schools of choice, are typically operated as not-for-profit organizations, essentially functioning as independent districts consisting of single schools, by
private groups including parents either independently or occasionally in conjunction with public institutions such as universities.
In return for being exempted from many state regulations, charter schools
are accountable for the academic achievement of their students. While charters vary in duration, they typically range from 3 to 5 years in length.15 When
contracts expire, depending on state law, charters can be renewed or terminated. Charter schools, although free from many state rules with regard to staff
and curricular issues, remain subject to federal and state antidiscrimination
laws such as those dealing with students with disabilities and employment. In
addition, charter schools typically cannot be operated by religious groups.16
* From “Faith-Based Charter Schools: An Idea Whose Time Is Unlikely to Come,” by C. J. Russo and
G. M. Cattaro, 2009, Religion and Education, 36(1), pp. 72-93. Copyright 2009 by the University of
Northern Iowa. Reprinted with permission.
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Of course, significant questions remain over the extent to which faculty and
staff in faith-based charter schools may actually teach about the religious beliefs and practices of their sponsors.
In light of the legal and educational issues surrounding the status of religious charter schools, this article is divided into two parts. The first section
reviews key litigation addressing the parameters of public aid to religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools because these cases provide the necessary background should judicial challenges arise to faith-based charter schools.17 This
first part of the paper also briefly reviews Supreme Court cases that forbid
prayer and/or religious activities in school, an essential part of daily activities
in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools that cannot continue in faith-based
charter schools. The second part reviews educational and policy considerations dealing with how publicly funded financial assistance might impact the
religious missions and identities of religiously affiliated nonpublic schools
that seek to become faith-based charter schools; this section also reviews the
constitutionality of both state aid to religious charter schools and the acceptability, if any, of prayer and religious activities in these schools. The article
rounds out with a brief conclusion.
Establishment Clause Litigation
Background
The extent to which jurisdictions can provide assistance to religious schools
depends on judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Added to the Constitution in
1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, according to the 16 words of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” While the
First Amendment only forbids Congress from making laws establishing religion, in 1940 the Supreme Court extended its reach to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut.18 Consequently, litigation
over state aid continues to be filed in both federal and state courts.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court created confusion over the appropriate
judicial standard when addressing state aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools and their students. As discussed below, the Court evaluates the constitutionality of such aid under the tripartite Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon),19
wherein it invalidated government aid in the form of salary supplements to
teachers. The Court has since modified the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton20
in which it allowed the on-site delivery of educational services for poor students in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. The Lemon-Agostini test
continues to engender controversy and lack of clarity because, as discussed
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below, it is an amalgam of two judicial standards, one dealing with prayer and
religious activity in schools, the other on tax exemptions for religious institutions used for worship. Even so, in applying Lemon-Agostini, the Court fails
to distinguish how it can be applied in such divergent situations as a kind of
“one-size-fits-all” standard in disputes over religion and education.
The Supreme Court accepted its first case on the merits on an Establishment
Clause case involving religion and public education in Everson v. Board of
Education (Everson).21 In Everson the Court upheld a law from New Jersey
that allowed parents to be reimbursed for the cost of transporting their children to religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. Since Everson, two camps
evolved in the judiciary on the question of aid: separationists and accommodationists. The former support the Jeffersonian metaphor calling for the
erection of a “wall of separation” between church and state,22 language that
does not appear in the Constitution; this is the perspective most often associated with the Supreme Court. Conversely, accommodationists reason that the
government is not prohibited from permitting some aid or accommodating
the needs of children under the so-called “Child Benefit Test” or from accommodating the religious preferences of parents who send their children to
public schools.
It is worth noting that the federal Constitution is more open to some forms
of aid to religious schools than its state counterparts. This distinction began to
emerge on December 7, 1875, when President Ulysses S. Grant, in his final
State of the Union address to Congress, called for a constitutional amendment
forbidding the teaching [of religion in public schools]...and prohibiting the
granting of any school funds, or school taxes or any part thereof, either by legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination.23

Following Grant’s speech, Senator James K. Blaine of Maine unsuccessfully
introduced a constitutional amendment in 1875 that would have prevented
aid from going to schools “under the control of any religious sect,”24 code
for Roman Catholic schools. Even though Blaine’s efforts failed, most jurisdictions adopted Blaine-type constitutional provisions that place substantial
limits on the amounts and types of aid that state governments can provide to
religious institutions, especially schools.25
Nineteenth-century concerns over the relationship between religion and
education aside, the Supreme Court did not, as indicated below, address its
first cases in this area until Everson in 1947. Over the ensuing years, the
Court’s modern Establishment Clause perspective on the constitutionality of
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aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic schools evolved through three phases,
each of which is described below. Insofar as the cases discussed in these
sections are likely to be applied in litigation challenging the constitutionality of religious charter schools, the remainder of this section highlights key
Supreme Court cases relevant to the parameters of permissible public aid to
religious schools.
The Child Benefit Test
Phase one. During the first phase, which began in 1947 with Everson
and ended in 1968 with Board of Education of Central School District No.
1 v. Allen,26 the Supreme Court enunciated the Child Benefit Test. This test
emerged as a legal construct that allows aid on the ground that doing so helps
students rather than their religiously affiliated nonpublic schools.
Everson upheld a statute from New Jersey that permitted the local board
to reimburse parents for the costs associated with sending their children to
religiously affiliated nonpublic schools.27 Without actually using the words
“Child Benefit Test,” a divided Supreme Court reasoned that it was permissible to extend a general benefit such as transportation to all children (and their
parents) without regard to their religious beliefs. However, in language portending future developments, in which it would take a hard line against most
forms of aid, Justice Black’s majority opinion introduced the Jeffersonian
metaphor, declaring that “the First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach.”28
After Everson, lower courts reached mixed results over the constitutionality of publicly funded transportation to students who attend religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools. Some cases forbade transportation to these students in determining that doing so violated state constitutions.29 Other courts
reached the opposite result in essentially relying on Child Benefit type analysis.30 In its only other case dealing with transportation and religious schools,
Wolman v. Walter (Wolman),31 the Supreme Court struck down a statute from
Ohio that permitted public funds to be used to provide buses for field trips
for children who attended religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. In treating
field trips as curriculum-related activities, the Justices largely viewed them as
impermissible instruction rather than as nonideological secular services such
as transportation.
In 1968, in Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen
(Allen),32 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law from New
York that required local school boards to loan textbooks for instruction in
secular subjects to children in grades 7 to 12 who attended nonpublic schools.
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While the statute did not specify that the books had to be the same as those
used in the public schools, it did require local public school board officials to
approve their use before they could be adopted. Basing its judgment primarily
on the Child Benefit Test, the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional
because its purpose was neither to aid religion nor nonpublic schools and that
its primary effect was to improve the quality of education for all children.
Until the Supreme Court allowed the delivery of services to individual
students as in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,33 Allen was the
outer limit of the Child Benefit Test for large groups of children prior to
its opinion in Agostini v. Felton;34 both of these cases are discussed below.
Further, the Court sustained the constitutionality of similar textbook provisions from Pennsylvania in Meek v. Pittenger (Meek)35 and Ohio in Wolman36
but struck down loans of instructional materials such as library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools. In
these cases the Court also allowed local school boards to provide diagnostic
services for auxiliary aid programs such as special education for students in
their religiously affiliated nonpublic schools but contended that the programs
had to be delivered off-site in public schools or neutral locations.
Phase two. Following their success in Everson and Allen, proponents of
the Child Benefit Test pushed the proverbial legal envelope by advancing
statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, respectively, dealing with a different form of aid. Both statutes provided assistance to religiously affiliated
nonpublic schools in the guise of salary supplements for teachers in nonpublic schools, an issue that would certainly emerge in disputes involving religious charter schools. In a case that has come to represent the standard test
in Establishment Clause cases, whether aid or prayer and religious activities
in schools,37 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 38 the Court invalidated both laws, ushering
in an era of strict adherence to the Jeffersonian wall of separation of church
and state.
In creating the tripartite measure destined to become known as the Lemon
test, the Supreme Court combined the two-part test it crafted in the companion
cases of Abington v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett 39 in striking down prayer
and Bible reading in public schools with a third element, addressing excessive entanglement, from Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City,40 which
upheld New York State’s practice of providing state property tax exemptions
for church property that is used in worship services. The Court wrote that:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
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from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement
with religion.”41

As to entanglement the Court specified that “we must examine the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority.”42
In Lemon the Justices distinguished impermissible aid for teachers’ salaries from acceptable secular, neutral services such as textbooks or transportation that it had upheld in Everson and Allen, fearing the necessary oversight
to ensure that teachers avoid nonideological perspectives in their classes.
Interestingly, as exemplified by the final case during the second phase in the
history of the Child Benefit Test, Aguilar v. Felton (Aguilar),43 most statutes
passed Lemon’s first two prongs, but ran afoul of the excessive entanglement
test, highlighting the fact that programs must pass all three of the independent prongs or be doomed. In Aguilar, a judgment reminiscent of Meek and
Wolman, the Court struck down on-site delivery of Title I services designed to
provide remedial instruction for poor children who attended religious schools
in New York City based solely on the fear of entanglement absent any allegations of inappropriate conduct.44
The years between Lemon and Aguilar, then, represented the nadir of the
Child Benefit Test from the perspective of proponents of the Child Benefit
Test, as the Supreme Court refused to move beyond the limits it created in
Everson and Allen. However, change was in the offing in the K-12 context in
light of the Court’s ruling in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.
Phase three. In upholding the constitutionality of a program of general
vocational assistance to a blind man who was studying to become a clergyman at a religious college in Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind,45 the Supreme Court signaled that change had arrived in its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Seven years later, in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District (Zobrest),46 the Justices began the reinvigoration of
the Child Benefit Test, allowing it to enter a phase that extends through the
present day. In Zobrest, the Court permitted the on-site delivery of a signlanguage interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)47 for a deaf student in Arizona who sought to attend a Catholic high
school. The Court decided that insofar as the interpreter provided neutral aid
to the student without offering financial benefits to his parent or school and
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there was no governmental participation in the instruction since the interpreter was only a conduit to effectuate the child’s communications, he was
entitled to the aid.
A year after Zobrest, though, the Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of a law from New York that created a school district that was contiguous with the boundaries of the village inhabited by members of a religious
community. The law was designed to accommodate the needs of parents of
children with disabilities so that their young would not have to be transported
outside of their community to received educational services under the IDEA.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (Kiryas
Joel),48 the Court struck the law down on the grounds that the school board
could have offered appropriate special education programs at one of its public
schools or at a neutral site near one of the village’s religious schools due to
risk of too close of an association between religion and the state.49
The most significant post-Lemon change in the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisdiction occurred in 1997 in Agostini v. Felton
(Agostini).50 The Justices dissolved the injunction that they upheld in Aguilar,
thereby permitting the on-site delivery of Title I services in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools in New York City. The Court held that the on-site
delivery did not violate the standards that it used to consider whether state
aid advanced religion since there was no governmental indoctrination, there
were no distinctions between recipients based on religion, and there was no
excessive entanglement between religion and government. Also repudiating
Meek and Wolman, the Court explained that a federal program that provides
supplemental, remedial instruction and counseling services to disadvantaged
children on a neutral basis is not unconstitutional when the assistance is provided on-site in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those that the New York City Board of
Education had created. The most significant jurisprudential development in
Agostini was that the Court modified the Lemon test by reviewing only its first
two parts, purpose and effect, while recasting entanglement as one element in
evaluating the statute’s effect.
Three years later, in Mitchell v. Helms,51 a case from Louisiana, the
Supreme Court expanded the limits of permissible aid to religiously affiliated
nonpublic schools. A plurality, meaning that less than a five Justice majority agreed on the rationale, expressly repudiating those parts of Meek and
Wolman to the contrary, upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that
permits the loans of instructional materials including library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools. In relying largely on the hybrid Agostini test, the Court pointed out that since the
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statute’s purpose was not in dispute, it only had to consider the law’s effect.
The Court thus found that the statute did not foster impermissible indoctrination because aid was allocated pursuant to neutral secular criteria that neither
favored nor disfavored religion and was available to all schools based on
secular, nondiscriminatory grounds.
The final Supreme Court case with direct relevance to the question of
aid to religious charter schools is Zelman v. Simmons–Harris (Zelman).52 In
Zelman, the Court upheld a voucher program from Ohio that was part of a
larger plan for helping poor students in Cleveland’s failing public schools
that had been taken over by the state as part of a desegregation remedy. Again
relying on Agostini, the Court addressed “whether the government acted with
the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religions [and] whether the aid has the
‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”53
Recognizing that the voucher program in Zelman had a valid secular purpose in providing aid for poor children, the Supreme Court examined whether
it had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. The Justices observed
that the voucher program was constitutional because, as part of the state’s
far-reaching attempt to provide greater educational opportunities for students
in a failing school system, it allocated aid pursuant to neutral secular criteria
that neither favored nor disfavored religion, was available to both religious
and secular recipients on nondiscriminatory grounds, and offered assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who directed the aid to religious schools
based entirely on their own genuine and independent private choices. In particular, the Court remarked that the law was constitutional insofar as it included safeguards so that tuition checks were sent to parents who them signed
them over to schools such that there was no direct exchange of funds between
religious schools and the state.
In Zelman, the Justices were unconcerned over that fact that most parents sent their children to religiously affiliated nonpublic schools because
surrounding public school districts refused to participate in the program. As
such, the Supreme Court acknowledged that since parents sent their children
to the religiously affiliated nonpublic schools not as a matter of law but since
they were unwelcomed in the public schools, the program passed constitutional muster. The Court concluded that since it was following an unbroken
line of its own precedent supporting private choice that provided benefits directly to needy private individuals, the voucher program was constitutional.
Not surprisingly, post-Zelman suits challenging vouchers focused on
state constitutional grounds since they are typically more stringent than
under their federal counterpart.54 In perhaps the most notable example, the
Supreme Court of Florida invalidated a voucher program for students who
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attended religious schools in interpreting the law authorizing it as violating the state constitution’s requirement of a uniform system of free public
schools.55 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that under a voucher program in Florida that was available to students who attended failing schools,
the state had no duty to pay for children to attend nonpublic schools.56 Further,
Maine’s highest court upheld a statute that prohibited using either state57 or
municipal58 money to pay tuition for children who attended religiously affiliated nonpublic schools.
Most recently, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal in a challenge
to AmeriCorps, the nationwide community service program. The Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of AmeriCorps,
which had similarities to the Title I program in Agostini, even though some
participants taught religion and secular subjects in religious schools since it
was a government program that was neutral toward religion.59 The Circuit
Court was also satisfied that Americorps was constitutional because it offered
aid directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, directed government aid
to religious schools entirely on their own genuine and independent private
choices. In its analysis, the court posited that no objective observer who was
familiar with Americorps’ history would have thought that the aid to religious
institutions had governmental endorsement or approval.
School-Sponsored Prayer and Religious Activity
While the Supreme Court’s perspective concerning aid to students and their
religiously affiliated nonpublic schools has passed through three distinct stages, its attitude toward school-sponsored prayer and religious activity in public
education has remained constant. Beginning with Engel v. Vitale (Engel)60 the
Justices have basically followed an unbroken line of cases prohibiting schoolsponsored prayer and religious activity in public schools.
Engel, the Supreme Court’s first case on point, involved a prayer composed by the New York State Board of Regents for suggested use in public
schools to inculcate moral and spiritual values in students. The prayer read:
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.”61 In response to a challenge to a local school board’s having adopted the prayer as
part of a policy requiring its daily recitation in class, the Court struck it down
as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court ruled that even absent
overt pressure, placing the power, privilege, and support of the government
qua school board behind a particular religious belief ran the risk of impos-
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ing indirect coercion on others, especially those who may have disagreed, to
conform to the officially approved religion.
The following year, in the companion cases of Abington v. Schempp
and Murray v. Curlett (Abington),62 the Supreme Court struck down prayer,
in the form of the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer or Our Father, depending
on one’s Christian denomination, and reading of Bible verses without commentary in cases from Pennsylvania and Maryland, respectively. In invalidating the practices, the Court crafted the first two prongs of the Lemon test
discussed earlier:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of
the [legislative] enactment?...[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.63

Aware of the backlash that its judgment may have created, the Court hastened
to add that its judgment did not prohibit the secular study of the Bible (or religion) in public schools in appropriate context such as literature or history.64
Subsequently, the Court invalidated displays of the 10 Commandments in
schools even though the material was paid for with private funds65 as well as
prayer at graduation66 and high school football games.67
Discussion
Educational and Policy Considerations
Faith-based charter schools are seeking to step in to fill the void left by the
closing of 1,200 religiously affiliated nonpublic schools between the years
2000 and 2006.68 Leaders in religiously affiliated nonpublic school systems
must grapple with increasing social secularism, population and demographic
shifts, such as the growth of the percentages of students in Catholic schools,
for example, who are not Catholic,69 rising costs, and financial distress in
light of the current economic conditions. These challenges present leaders
in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools with the greatest challenge in their
history as they attempt to offer affordable quality educational alternatives for
families while staying faithful to their religious-educational missions. In fact,
many historically culturally rich religious organizations face uphill battles
against long odds in many places for survival, a situation that educational
leaders in earlier generations neither experienced nor anticipated.
The existential crisis confronting leaders in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools has generated a situation of organizational ecology that can be
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characterized as a Darwinist perspective requiring institutions to seek ongoing viability in an environment where “survival of the fittest” rules the
day.70 The advent of the charter school movement, while far from serving as
a cure-all for the ailments that afflict religiously affiliated nonpublic schools,
may have provided the worthwhile impetus compelling leaders in faith-based
schools to confront their dire straits concerning the organizational mortality
of their systems and the potential demise of individual schools.
Underpinning the charter school movement is that they provide educational choice, less bureaucracy, and a reduced amount of public financial
contributions, apparently making for a perfect fit since such schools are seemingly modeled after the religious schools that they are largely replacing. In
light of the organizational characteristics that charter schools generally share
with religiously affiliated nonpublic schools, it may be easy to see why some
faith-based educational leaders misguidedly viewed the exterior infrastructures of charter schools as providing quick fixes to their dilemmas in pursuit of the preservation of quality (religious) education. While many leaders
in faith-based schools accept the notion of religious charter schools in good
faith, they are deceived by a systemic isomorphic, or similar, organizational
structure that mimics the success that religious schools have long enjoyed.71
More to the point, organizers of charter schools seek to flatten organizational structures in applying the principle of solidarity by bringing educational
decision-making to the local level in the hope of improving student achievement because they share many of the same characteristics of religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. Among the qualities that charter and traditional
religiously affiliated nonpublic schools have in common are that they tend
to be mission driven, focus on academic achievement, operate as schools of
choice, engage parents in the education of their children, provide a familylike learning atmosphere, build and anchor communities, promote a spirit
of innovation, foster teacher professionalism, and offer new models of accountability.72 Yet, what may be missing in charter schools are the intangible
elements such as the faith dimensions or the beliefs of members of school
communities that have helped faith-based schools succeed. Put another way,
it is unclear how it is possible to have faith-based schools without allowing
educators to teach explicitly about the faith and praxis that served as the engine that drove religiously affiliated nonpublic schools for generations.
In this mix, since most recognize the great good that religious schools
have long provided,73 not the least of which is saving public funds,74 proponents of faith-based charter schools wish to establish schools as many religiously affiliated nonpublic schools cease operations. Of course, significant
legal issues will arise when charter school organizers attempt to find ways
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to circumvent constitutional and statutory provisions75 expressly prohibiting
them from implementing some of the very same characteristics that helped
provide success in faith-based schools such as their religiosity and shared
faith communities in attempting to open religious charter schools.
The initial openness of religious leaders, particularly in the Catholic
school systems in Washington, D.C. and New York City,76 to convert some of
their schools into faith-based charter schools may well have been propelled
by the superficial similarities between the two systems and the positive assistance that both can continue to offer in local communities, especially in inner
cities. Along with these attributes, other external structures in the organization of public charter schools such as adaptability and flexibility find a great
fit in the religious school culture while likewise adding to their isomorphic
natures. In this regard, an argument may be made that charter schools are flexible enough to offer religious objectives in educational programming.77
On closer examination, though, it appears that the external organizational
features of proposed faith-based charter schools only mimic the organizational domains of religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. Such a situation
creates an ephemeral, even unreachable or unattainable, goal for those who
wish to serve underrepresented populations in faith-based institutions since
they would have to be transformed to what might be described as “religious
schools-lite,” schools constructed around religious themes broadly but which,
based on the current state of the law, cannot include teachings of particular
faiths as long as they receive public funds. Moreover, as legal controversies
emerge, conflicts will arise in such key areas as governance and curricular
content, incident to conflict over the notion of “control follows the dollar,”
topics that are discussed in the next section.
Legal Issues
As the number of religiously affiliated nonpublic schools declines, supporters of faith-based charter schools will undoubtedly step up their efforts to circumvent existing judicial precedent, statutes, and/or constitutional provisions
restricting their ability to operate such schools. Yet, regardless of whether
challengers apply the Lemon test or its hybrid Agostini version, the preceding
review of litigation should demonstrate the likely insurmountable difficulty
that supporters of faith-based charter schools will face in attempting to fend
off Establishment Clause scrutiny.
The likelihood that laws creating religious charter schools will be struck
down is very real because it is virtually impossible to argue that they can satisfy the requirements of having secular legislative purposes while avoiding
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the advancing of religion, and/or sidestep concerns with excessive entanglement of religion and government, not only due to questions of aid but also
on account of issues dealing with religious content in school curricula and
other activities. Further, to the extent that faith-based charter schools would
be seeking public funds, their religious practices would come under intense
scrutiny insofar as the application of “control follows the dollar” would require closer oversight by governmental bodies, thereby exacerbating the constitutional difficulties, especially with regard to entanglement.
As individuals and/or groups seek to operate religious charter schools,
they are likely to face a myriad of legal issues dealing with such significant
issues as governance, parental choice, and the place of prayer and religious
activity in schools and their curricula. As to the fundamental question of governance, to the extent that Catholic schools, for instance, are typically part of
larger parish legal corporations, it is unclear how transfers of title would be
viewed legally, especially if religious leaders were involved in establishing of
governing boards. That is, since governance corresponds to the set of policies
and customs by which organizations are controlled, thus ensuring representation by stakeholders, it is unclear what role the government would have in
arrangements of this nature.
At the same time, when applied to faith-based charter schools, the notion of governance suggests that some other “body” is in control, such as an
independent governing board, that may not share the beliefs of parents who
wish to send their children to these schools. Consequently, while faith-based
charter schools may offer opportunities for streamlined models of educational delivery and site-based control similar to what occurs in religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools,78 they must rely on outside bodies, or boards, of
control. Even though religious institutions, acting as sponsors, may provide
buildings and agencies for charter schools, they are unlikely to be exempt
from the control issues related to not-for-profit boards, state statutes, and
federal guidelines.
Faith-based charter schools are also likely to be confronted by a series of
difficult questions with the potential to impact significantly their missions and
identities, especially if they had formerly operated as religiously affiliated
nonpublic schools. For example, how many parents of students in faith-based
charter schools will not be parishioners or even members of their faith communities? Will school officials be required to report students who are undocumented aliens? If faculty members are to serve as role models, who will define
what it means to do so, particularly in the context of Title VII and exceptions
that allow religious employers to hire members of their own faiths?79 Whose
health curriculum, relating to such matters as birth control and abortion, will
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have to be taught? Will administrators and teachers be viewed as ministers of
the faith or agents of the state?
Additional questions are likely to emerge pursuant to the notion that parents opted to send their children to religious charter schools based on their own
independent private choices. The notion of parental choice that the Supreme
Court accepted in Zelman notwithstanding, challengers will raise questions
over the extent to which such independent decision-making measures up with
the requisite safeguards that need to be in place to avoid entanglement between religion and government, regardless of whether one applies the original Lemon or its modification in Agostini. Further, as reflected in Kiryas Joel,
even when public officials try to accommodate sincerely held parental religious beliefs for the benefit of their children, Establishment Clause issues
can come to the fore that would invalidate what may appear to be reasonable
requests designed for the best educational interest of students.
Other significant challenges to religious charter schools will surface in
connection with interrelated concerns dealing with prayer and religious activity, religious artifacts/iconography80 in schools, and curricular content control. Serious concerns arise here under the purpose, effect, and entanglement
prongs of Lemon-Agostini, especially in light of potential allegations that educators have advanced religion, a claim that has already surfaced in connection with the instructional program at a Muslim charter school in Minnesota,81
a claim that its supporters dispute.82
Complying with case law will undoubtedly require educational leaders
to prevent prayer and religious activity from taking place in faith-based charter schools, the posting of religious artifacts/iconography in schools,83 and
instruction about religion from curricula, changes that would fundamentally
modify their nature and missions. In this light, it is mystifying why Catholic
religious leaders in the District of Columbia and New York City84 would have
chosen to embark on such an approach.85 While it may be admirable that
these leaders tried to ensure the survival of the diversity that religious schools
provide in the educational marketplace of ideas, at what cost are they doing
so? Are they essentially “robbing Peter to pay Paul” in creating faith-based
charter schools that could probably not teach about religion? In other words,
to the extent that religiously affiliated nonpublic schools, especially at the elementary school level, are dedicated to the inculcation of the beliefs of their
faiths, it remains to be seem how such schools can survive judicial challenges
if they teach about religion.
As to the issue of religion in curricula, it is mystifying why religious leaders would seek to move to a faith-based charter school model since they will
have lost substantial, if not total, control over school operations. A related
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question is whether courts would treat transfers in ownership in title over
buildings as sham transactions that are essentially designed to accomplish
educational/curricular goals that they had hitherto been prohibited from pursuing. Further, even if one places the issue of ownership and control aside,
insofar as charter schools are public schools, albeit ones that are free from
many state requirements, and it is well settled that they can teach about religion but cannot teach religion per se,86 disputes are likely to emerge over how
pervasive religion is in school curricula.
The upshot is that to the extent that faith-based charter schools seek to
teach about religion in a manner similar to what transpires in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools, then, consistent with precedent, they will be prohibited from doing so. Beyond that, even if faith-based charter schools are
able to teach about religion, it opens the door to the specter of having civil
educational officials decide what can and cannot be taught in religion classes,
thereby running the risk of casting a new “pall of orthodoxy”87 on the free exercise of religion in educational settings. This is a situation that even the most
ardent proponents of faith-based charter schools would not welcome.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, despite the well-intentioned efforts of their supporters,
the combination of constitutional and statutory prohibitions, in conjunction
with long-standing judicial precedent, make it clear that organizers of faithbased charter schools are unlikely to have much success. Thus, proponents
of faith-based charter schools may have to go back to the proverbial drawing
board in attempting to devise means of serving children whose parents would
like them educated in religious environments.
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